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Introduction 
 
On March 23, 2010 President Barack Obama signed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act, better known as ACA or Obamacare, into law. Right before signing the law, Obama 
acknowledged the importance of the law, but also the hard road towards it. ‘‘Today, after almost 
a century of trying; today, after over a year of debate; today, after all the votes have been tallied – 
health insurance reform becomes law in the United States of America.’’1 These historical words 
seem to mark the end of a long journey, but nothing is less true. The bill was well received by 
Democrats, but Republicans were very much against it. They have unsuccessfully tried to block 
it, but even after the law was signed, they did not give up their protests. Many individuals were 
against the Health Care Reform as well, and some of them decided to fight Obamacare in the 
courts. So far there have been three legal challenges that made it all the way to the Supreme 
Court: National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 
and King v. Burwell. In these different court cases, the Supreme Court has upheld the 
constitutionality of the individual mandate, it has decided that states cannot be forced to 
participate in a new Medicaid program, it has weakened the birth control coverage, and it ruled 
in favor of subsidies.2 
 The Supreme Court cases were closely watched by many commentators and individuals. 
The Supreme Court, consisting of nine Justices, had the power to repeal or change the law 
dramatically, and to a certain extent it did. Since only nine individuals hold this much power it is 
                                                 
1 Barack Obama, ‘‘Remarks by the President and Vice President at Signing of the Health Insurance Reform Bill,’’ 
March 23, 2010, https://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/president-obama-signs-health-reform-
law#transcript, paragraph 18. 
2 ‘‘Healthcare Timeline,’’ The White House, accessed February 27, 2016, https://www.whitehouse.gov/health-care-
in-america.  
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important to examine their reasons and logic behind the decisions. Therefore, the main question 
of this thesis will be: what are the legal arguments used by the Supreme Court Justices in the 
‘Obamacare’ decisions, what are the extralegal aspects according to commentators and how do 
these two relate and influence each other?  
Various people doubt whether the Obamacare court decisions were made with complete 
objectivity. Many scholars agree that, despite a theoretical separation of powers, the US Supreme 
Court is a political body and its Justices often act according to their personal political preference. 
According to N. Maveety, political process-based research on the judicial branch goes all the 
way back to 1925, when Robert Cushman first identified the political function of the Supreme 
Court. Consequently, scholars developed a new approach to the judicial decision making that 
included looking at ‘‘the external environment of judicial decisions, attempting to describe 
judges as participants in and reactive to the political process.’’3 Rehder also points out that, in 
contrast to scholars who write about European courts, scholars who investigate US courts 
broadly acknowledge that there is politicization of the legal system.4 Richard Davis takes this 
even one step further. In his book Justices and Journalists he argues that Justices use their 
‘celebrity status’ to ‘‘become political players both on and off the bench’’5 and to ‘‘shape press 
coverage and the resulting public opinion.’’6 According to Davis, the Justices use the media to 
gain general support for the Supreme Court as well as try to change public policy on some 
issues.7  
 
                                                 
3 N. Maveety, ‘‘The Study of Judicial Behavior and the Discipline of Political Science,’’ in The Pioneers of Judicial 
Behavior, ed. N. Maveety (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2002), 23. 
4 Britta Rehder, ‘‘What is Political about Jurisprudence? Courts, Politics and Political Science in Europe and the 
United States,’’ Contemporary Readings in Law and Social Justice 2, no. 1 (2010): 100.  
5 Richard Davis, Justices and journalists: The US Supreme Court and the Media (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011), 174. 
6 Ibid., 188. 
7 Ibid. 
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 Many studies have investigated the behavior and the ideology of judges in general and 
Supreme Court Justices more specifically and many scholars find that Supreme Court Justices’ 
voting behavior is strongly correlated to the President who appointed them. Justices appointed by 
Democratic Presidents tend to vote more liberal than Justices appointed by Republican 
Presidents. This difference is especially present in civil rights cases. According to Epstein and 
Posner ‘‘these findings support the realist understanding that many cases that reach the Supreme 
Court tend both to be highly charged politically and to be indeterminate from a legalist 
standpoint, forcing the Justices back on their priors—which often have an ideological 
component—to resolve the case.’’8 Epstein and Posner support their claims by statistical 
evidence based on large n-studies. By researching the voting pattern in an x amount of cases, 
they were able to make broad statements about the ideological leanings of judges. There are 
many others who follow in this approach.  
 Of course, it is not always possible to predict the votes of the Justices based on their 
ideological leanings. Justices can sometimes vote differently to avoid looking too liberal or too 
conservative.9 It is also possible that Justices drift from their original ideology after a few terms 
in office. They might become more or less conservative and sway from the ideology they once 
shared with the President who appointed them.10 Nevertheless, it is possible to distinguish liberal 
Justices from conservative Justices. The liberal/ conservative divide is related to political party 
preferences. However, it is not automatically the case that a liberal outlook means that the Justice 
is a Democrat. There is a difference between ideological values and legal values.  
 
                                                 
8 Lee Epstein et al., The Behavior of Federal Judges: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), 8. 
9 Ibid., 70. 
10 Lee Epstein et al., ‘‘Ideological Drift among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and How Important?,’’ 
Northwestern University Law Review 101, no. 4 (2007): 46-47. 
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 Ideological values can be linked to political values and the corresponding political party. 
For instance, a conservative Justice would be linked to the Republican party. If this Justice were 
influenced by his or her ideological values he or she might vote that Obamacare is 
unconstitutional, because as a Republican he or she is against the law. However, if for instance 
the conservative judge believes in judicial minimalism, a legal value, that Justice might uphold 
the law because he or she does not believe in an active Court. It is therefore important to make a 
distinction between ideological and legal values. It is nearly impossible for a Justice to act 
without legal values, and it is not necessarily good or bad to have legal values. If, however, a 
Justice would be guided by his or her political preference, this would pose a problem. Since 
Supreme Court Justices are appointed for life, they are not politically accountable, and therefore 
it could be dangerous if they acted based on their political preference. 
 There are many different legal values that Justices can hold. Two big schools of thought 
on legal values are those of the ‘living constitution’ and ‘originalism’. Strauss explains the living 
constitution as a constitution that ‘‘evolves, changes over time, and adapts to new circumstances, 
without being formally amended.’’11 This is usually done by judges whose interpretations of the 
document change over time.12 Originalism on the other hand, ‘‘is the antithesis of the idea that 
we have a living constitution. It is the view that constitutional provisions mean what the people 
who adopted them - in the 1790s or 1860s or whenever - understood them to mean.’’13 Justices in 
this school might for instance look at papers the Founding Fathers wrote to help guide them to 
the original understanding of the Constitution. When Supreme Court Justices are asked to apply 
the constitution to a certain case, it will thus matter what legal values they adhere to. Other legal 
values are those of judicial activism or judicial restraint. Judicial activism broadly means that a 
                                                 
11 David A. Strauss, The Living Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 1. 
12 Ibid., 2. 
13 Ibid., 3. 
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Justice or court is willing to invalidate federal or state laws and is willing to deviate from judicial 
precedents. When a Justice or court shows judicial restraint they are usually unwilling to 
invalidate laws or precedents.14  
 It is thus important to make a distinction between ideological and legal values. Whereas 
ideological values are usually seen as undesirable, legal values are unavoidable. When people 
talk about political preferences that shape the opinions of the Supreme Court, first it should be 
made clear whether the decisions are based on legal values or on ideological preferences. Some 
scholars, like Pritchett15, forget to make this distinction. Consequently, it is hard to draw 
conclusions about the Supreme Court and its Justices from these studies. Many other scholars 
who write about the ideological values of the Justices choose to do a large n-study.16 Through a 
counting of votes, they are able to make conclusions about the ideological leanings of different 
Justices. Unfortunately, it is hard to make the distinction between an ideological and a legal vote. 
It is therefore questionable whether the results of these studies show the ideological leaning of 
the Justices or the legal values of the Justices. Therefore, this study will not be a large n-study, 
but a case study. By focusing on only three different Supreme Court cases, National Federation 
of Independent Business v. Sebelius, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, and King v. Burwell, it will 
be possible to look more closely at the specific circumstances of the cases. The goal of this study 
is to determine whether legal or ideological/ extralegal arguments shaped the opinions of these 
court cases and how these relate and influence each other. It will be shown that both legal and 
extralegal arguments shape the opinion of the Court. It is possible to find legal arguments to fit 
                                                 
14 Stefanie A. Lindquist et al., ‘‘The Rhetoric of Restraint and the Ideology of Activism,’’ Constitutional 
Commentary 24, no. 103 (2007): 105-106. 
15 Charles Herman Pritchett, The Roosevelt court: a study in judicial politics and values, 1937-1947 (New York: 
MacMillan, 1948). 
16 See for instance Epstein or Jeffrey A. Segal and Albert D. Cover, ‘‘Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. 
Supreme Court Justices,’’ The American Political Science Review 83, no. 2 (1989). 
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(almost) every ideological leaning, and therefore it is hard to distinguish one from the other. The 
issue is thus very complex and therefore one must be careful when analyzing the political 
influences within the Supreme Court decisions.  
 Because the issue is so complex I am aware that it is hard to make a clear distinction 
between legal and ideological or extralegal arguments. The secret inner workings of the Supreme 
Court often leave scholars with no choice but to guess the real motivation behind certain 
decisions. Nevertheless, the discussion will be valuable, since it will lay out some of the 
difficulties about the discussion of the politicization of the Supreme Court. The decision to study 
only three different court cases will limit the scope of this research and therefore more research 
will need to be done in order to make a more convincing claim about the politics of the Supreme 
Court in general. Nevertheless, this research might be a good starting point for future research. 
 This thesis will look at the three challenges separately and in chronological order. The 
first legal challenge to ‘Obamacare’ is National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius. 
After that, the second legal challenge to ‘Obamacare’ (Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores) will be 
discussed. And finally it will also look at the third legal challenge to ‘Obamacare’ (King v. 
Burwell). The sources that will be used are the Supreme Court decisions, the arguments of the 
Justices, and articles from law review journals. Articles written by constitutional experts 
evaluating the decisions and the ideology of the Supreme Court Justices that were published in 
newspapers like The Washington Post and The New York Times will also be used.  
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The First Challenge: National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius 
 
The first legal challenge to Obamacare was already prepared before the act became law. 
Professor Randy E. Barnett was among the first to question the controversial act that fostered no 
Republican support at all. According to The New York Times Barnett can be considered the 
‘intellectual godfather’ of the challenge.17 Barnett himself states that he started to commit to the 
Obamacare challenge in November 2009. His main claim is that the individual mandate, which 
forces people to buy health insurance on pain of a penalty, was unprecedented and therefore 
unconstitutional.18 In the beginning, only few people took his challenge seriously. According to 
The New York Times ‘‘many of his colleagues, on both the left and the right, dismissed the idea as 
ridiculous.’’19 Professor Douglas Laycock for instance said: ‘‘He's gotten an amazing amount of 
attention for an argument that he created out of whole cloth. Under existing case law this is a 
very easy case; this is obviously constitutional. I think he's going to lose eight to one.’’20 In the 
end, his critics had to bite their tongues, because the challenge quickly worked its way up to the 
Supreme Court.  
The Supreme Court Justices divided the law suit into four parts. First, the Court would 
decide whether the Anti-Injunction Act would prevent them from hearing the case. If the law is 
considered a tax, the Anti-Injunction Law states that the case cannot be heard because you cannot 
fight taxes in court before they are implemented. The penalty mentioned in the ACA was not 
                                                 
17
 Kate Zernike, ‘‘Proposed Amendment Would Enable States to Repeal Federal Law,’’ New York Times, December 
20, 2010, https://global-factiva-
com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2443/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=NYTF000020101224e6ck00011&cat=a&ep=ASE. 
18
 Randy E. Barnett, ‘‘Foreword’’ in Unprecedented: The Constitutional Challenge to Obamacare, Josh Blackman 
(New York: Perseus Books Group, 2013), ix. 
19
 Charlie Savage and Sheryl Gay Stolberg, ‘‘Vindication for Challenger of Health Care Law,’’ New York Times, 
March 27, 2012, https://global-factiva-
com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2443/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=NYTF000020120327e83r00074&cat=a&ep=ASE. 
20
 Ibid. 
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scheduled to be implemented until 2014, which means that if the penalty is regarded as a tax, the 
lawsuit could not be filed before 2014. Second, there was the question of the constitutionality of 
the individual mandate. Third, the Court would decide whether the Medicaid expansion was 
constitutional. Medicaid is a state based social health care program which already existed before 
the ACA became law. The ACA relies on states to voluntarily expand this program, but if states 
choose not to do this, they are in danger of losing their already existing federal Medicaid funds. 
Finally, the Court heard arguments on whether the law could survive, if part of it was declared 
unconstitutional.21 The Court scheduled six hours of hearing time, which is an astonishing 
amount of time, since most cases before the Supreme Court only get one hour of hearing time.22 
After hearing all the arguments and carefully deliberating them for approximately three months, 
the Court presented its decision.  
First of all, the Court ruled that the Anti-Injunction Act does not bar the suit, because 
‘‘Congress did not intend the payment to be treated as a ‘tax’ for purposes of the Anti-Injunction 
Act.’’23 Secondly, with regard to the individual mandate the Court ruled that the individual 
mandate could not be sustained under the Commerce Clause, because the mandate is not an 
existing commercial activity and the Clause does not allow Congress to create new commerce. 
The mandate could also not be sustained under the Necessary and Proper Clause, because this 
clause only allows Congress to make all laws necessary and proper in those areas where it has 
been granted power by the Constitution. Since Congress does not have the powers needed to 
enforce the individual mandate, it cannot do so. However, the Court ruled that the mandate can 
                                                 
21
 Josh Blackman, Unprecedented: The Constitutional Challenge to Obamacare (New York: Perseus Books Group, 
2013), 167-168. 
22
 Ibid, 167. 
23
 U.S. Supreme Court. 2012. National Federation of Independent Business et al. v. Sebelius, Secretary of Health 
and Human Services, et al., syllabus 11-393 U.S. 2.  
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be upheld under the Taxing Clause, because it is possible to interpret the mandate as a tax.24 With 
regard to the Medicaid expansion, the Court ruled that it was unconstitutional, because states 
might lose existing Medicaid funding if they do not agree to the new expansion:  
 
The threatened loss of over 10 percent of a State’s overall budget is economic dragooning 
that leaves the States with no real option but to acquiesce in the Medicaid expansion. The 
Government claims that the expansion is properly viewed as only a modification of the 
existing program, and that this modification is permissible because Congress reserved the 
“right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision” of Medicaid. §1304. But the expansion 
accomplishes a shift in kind, not merely degree. […] A State could hardly anticipate that 
Congress’s reservation of the right to “alter” or “amend” the Medicaid program included 
the power to transform it so dramatically. The Medicaid expansion thus violates the 
Constitution by threatening States with the loss of their existing Medicaid funding if they 
decline to comply with the expansion.25 
 
Finally, the Court ruled that the law could survive, because the other provisions of the Affordable 
Care Act are not affected by the Medicaid expansion. The Court assumed that Congress wanted 
the law to survive, and therefore the justices would let it.26 
The case was heard by all nine Justices of the Supreme Court, namely Chief Justice John 
Roberts, and Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Samuel Alito, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan. Three of the 
                                                 
24
 National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, syllabus, 3-4. 
25
 Ibid, 5. 
26
 Ibid.  
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Justices are surrounded by some kind of controversy regarding their decision and/or participation 
in the case. These are Chief Justice John Roberts, Justice Clarence Thomas, and Justice Elena 
Kagan. Some have suggested that these three Justices were influenced by their own ideological 
convictions. Therefore, these Justices will be discussed in turn to better understand how and why 
they voted and why the outcome of this case was so surprising. 
The outcome of the case and Roberts’s reasoning in the majority opinion has been widely 
criticized. A part of Barnett’s argument was accepted, because the mandate was found 
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. However, 
the Chief Justice was able to find a compromise that nevertheless enabled him to regard the 
mandate as constitutional. In the opinion Roberts explains that the ‘penalty,’ as described in the 
law, cannot be seen as a tax under the Anti-Injunction law, therefore enabling the Court to hear 
the case.27 However, Roberts concludes that the individual mandate can be upheld under the 
Taxing Clause, because ‘‘it is ‘fairly possible’ to interpret the mandate as imposing […] a tax.’’28 
The irony of calling something a tax and not a tax at the same time, while the original law does 
not use the word tax at all, is not overlooked by many commentators. The weird ‘twistification’29 
is basis for much critique.30 For instance, Doug Bandow, explains that ‘‘the chief justice 
appeared to take the most political course possible. He offered the Legal Right rhetoric and the 
Legal Left results. […] The Chief Justice will enthusiastically rewrite their [the Liberals] 
                                                 
27
 National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, syllabus, 2 
28
 Ibid, 3-4. 
29
 Jeffrey Rosen, ‘‘Welcome to the Roberts Court: How the Chief Justice Used Obamacare to Reveal His True 
Identity,’’ New Republic, June 29, 2012, http://www.newrepublic.com/blog/plank/104493/welcome-the-roberts-
court-who-the-chief-justice-was-all-along. 
30
 For instance: David Cole, ‘‘Obamacare Upheld: How and Why Did Justice Roberts Do It?,’’ The Nation, June 28, 
2012, http://www.thenation.com/article/obamacare-upheld-how-and-why-did-justice-roberts-do-it/., Terence P. 
Jeffrey, ‘‘Chief Justice Roberts: It's Not A Tax, It Is A Tax; It's Law, But It's Not 'Unlawful' to Break It,’’ CNS News, 
June 28, 2012, http://cnsnews.com/news/article/chief-justice-roberts-its-not-tax-it-tax-its-law-its-not-unlawful-
break-it., Ilya Shapiro, ‘‘The Obamacare "Tax" That Chief Justice Roberts Invented Is Still Unconstitutional,’’ 
Forbes, May 12, 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/ilyashapiro/2014/05/12/the-obamacare-tax-that-chief-justice-
roberts-invented-is-still-unconstitutional/. 
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legislation to make it constitutional.’’31 
The fact that Roberts voted to uphold the law was very surprising. Roberts was appointed 
to the Court by President George W. Bush in 2005.32 He was chosen to lead the Court in a 
conservative manner and thus many expected him to strike down the law. Some say that Roberts 
changed his view during the deliberations; first agreeing with the conservative Justices Kennedy, 
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito that the law was unconstitutional, but later on siding with the more 
liberal Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Breyer.33 We can only speculate on what 
swayed Roberts, since the inner-workings of the Supreme Court are very secretive. Barnett and 
Blackman, for instance, speculate that Roberts might have changed his mind after President 
Obama, amongst others, put pressure on Roberts to uphold the law.34 However, this reasoning is 
not completely convincing because Justices are appointed for life, and therefore they cannot be 
subject to political pressure, at least in theory.  
 Charles Krauthammer argues that Roberts has two identities: his jurisprudential identity 
where he is a constitutional conservative and his institutional identity in which he is Chief Justice 
‘‘and sees himself as uniquely entrusted with the custodianship of the court’s legitimacy, 
reputation and stature.’’35 With the Obamacare case, Roberts chose to listen to his institutional 
identity, fearing that the Court’s reputation would be damaged if a duly passed legislation was 
                                                 
31Doug Bandow, ‘‘John Roberts: Rarely Has Such a Smart Judge Written Such a Bad Opinion,’’ Forbes, July 2, 
2012, http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/john-roberts-rarely-has-such-smart-judge-written-such-bad-
opinion. 
32
 Supreme Court of the United States, ‘‘Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court,’’ accessed October 
20, 2015, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx, paragraph 1. 
33
 Jan Crawford, ‘‘Roberts switched views to uphold health care law,’’ CBS News, July 2, 2012, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/roberts-switched-views-to-uphold-health-care-law/. 
34
 Randy Barnett, ‘‘Lobbying the Chief Justice (again),’’ Washington Post, March 2, 2015, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/03/02/lobbying-the-chief-justice-again/. And 
Blackman, 226-227. 
35
 Charles Krauthammer, ‘‘Why Roberts did it,’’ Washington Post, June 28, 2012, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/charles-krauthammer-why-roberts-did-
it/2012/06/28/gJQA4X0g9V_story.html. 
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overturned by a partisan Court.36 Others compare Roberts to Justice Marshall and National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius to Marybury v. Marshall. In both cases the 
Right’s constitutional arguments were accepted, but the opinion was constructed in such a way as 
to avoid having a huge political influence.37  
Many on the right are – for obvious reasons – very disappointed with Roberts and among 
many things accuse him of being a ‘‘finger-to-the-wind politician,’’38 to have found a ‘‘strange 
new respect [for liberals],’’39 and to have ‘‘the kind of sophistry we expect from liberals.’’40 
Although ‘‘both supporters and detractors seemed to agree that political rather than legal factors 
shaped the position and opinion of the Chief Justice,’’41 not everybody agrees that a left-wing 
political inclination lies at the roots of Robert’s decision. Scholars such as Hopper and Adler 
argue that his opinion is very much in line with his conservative judicial beliefs. Hopper refers to 
Ranho Viejo, LLC v. Norton in which Roberts decided that the Commerce Clause has a limited 
reach and it cannot be used to validate the governments ban on the possession of firearms in 
school zones. It therefore ‘‘should have been no surprise that Chief Justice Roberts would 
conclude that the individual mandate in the ACA had exceeded the constitutional limitation to 
regulate commerce.’’42 Ranho Viejo also proves that Roberts prefers to uphold legislation 
                                                 
36
 Krauthammer.  
37John Yoo, ‘‘Chief Justice Roberts and His Apologists,’’ Wall Street Journal, June 29, 2012, 
http://www.wsj.com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/articles/SB10001424052702303561504577496520011395292. 
38
 James Taranto, ‘‘We Blame George W. Bush,’’ Wall Street Journal, June 28, 2012, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304058404577494622616505142. 
39
 Ibid.  
40
 Marc A. Thiessen, ‘‘Why are Republicans so awful at picking Supreme Court justices?,’’ Washington Post, July 2, 
2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/marc-a-thiessen-why-are-republicans-so-awful-at-picking-
supreme-court-justices/2012/07/02/gJQAHFJAIW_story.html. 
41
 Neil S. Siegel, ‘‘More Law than Politics’’ in The Health Care Case: The Supreme Court's Decision and Its 
Implications, ed. Nathaniel Persily, Gillian E. Metzger, and Trevor W. Morrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013), 192.  
42 M. Reed Hopper, ‘‘How an environmental commerce cause challenge presaged the decision of Chief Justice 
Roberts in NFIB v. Sebelius,’’ Kentucky Journal of Equine, Agriculture, and Natural Resources Law 7, no. 1 (2015): 
90. 
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whenever possible, as here he also sought ‘‘alternative grounds for sustaining application of the 
Act that may be more consistent with Supreme Court precedent.’’43 Johnathan Adler shows the 
same tendency by Roberts to use a ‘saving construction.’ In Northwest Austin Municipal Utility 
District No. 1 v. Holder and Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life ‘‘Roberts 
has shown a willingness to elevate this conception of judicial restraint above plain readings of 
statutory text.’’44 Roberts’s judicial minimalism thus explains his ruling in the ACA case. He 
probably regarded his institutional identity as the more important one is this case, not wanting to 
damage the credibility of the Supreme Court. On top of that, it would be very surprising if 
Roberts’s decision was influenced by his political preference. We can assume that, as former 
Counsel of President Reagan and appointee of President Bush, he still is a conservative. It would 
therefore be very surprising if this liberal outcome was the consequence of his political 
preference; more likely the outcome was influenced by his legal value of judicial restraint.  
 There is also some controversy surrounding Justice Thomas’ decision to hear the case. 
Many petitioned Thomas to recuse himself in the health care case. According to US law, a Justice 
should recuse himself if his or her ‘‘impartiality might reasonably be questioned.’’45 It is not 
possible to force a Supreme Court judge to recuse. In order to convince Thomas to step down 
over 100,000 signatures were collected and brought to the Supreme Court.46 Moreover, 74 
members of Congress, led by Democrat Anthony D. Weiner, wrote a letter to Thomas urging him 
to ‘‘recuse from this case.  If the US Supreme Court's decision is to be viewed as legitimate by 
                                                 
43
 Hopper, 91. 
44
 Jonathan H. Adler, ‘‘Judicial Minimalism, the Mandate, and Mr. Roberts’’ in The Health Care Case: The Supreme 
Court's Decision and Its Implications, ed. Nathaniel Persily, Gillian E. Metzger, and Trevor W. Morrison (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), 174. 
45
 28 U.S. Code § 455, ‘‘Disqualification of justice, judge, or magistrate judge.’’ 
46
 Mike Sacks, ‘‘Clarence Thomas Petitioned By 100,000 Progressives To Recuse Himself From Health Care 
Cases,’’ Huffington Post, February 17, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/17/clarence-thomas-petition-
recuse-health-care_n_1284610.html. 
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the American people, this is the only correct path.’’47 The reason for these petitions is the 
involvement of Thomas’ wife in a Tea Party organization called Liberty Central that was founded 
by Virginia Thomas with the goal to target the Obamacare bill. The group provided social media 
support and organization to anti-Obamacare rallies.48 In August 2011, Virginia spoke out strongly 
and directly against Obamacare saying: ‘‘I think we need to repeal Obamacare.’’49 After stepping 
down from Liberty Central, Virginia Thomas founded Liberty Consulting, a lobbying firm 
dedicated to “effective advocacy and assistance on behalf of those liberty-loving citizens and 
organizations who wish to preserve limited government, free enterprise, national security, 
individual liberty and personal responsibility.”50 With this firm, and other anti-Obamacare 
activities, financial gains were at stake for Virginia Thomas. Some of Thomas’s opponents 
mockingly stated: ‘‘this dude’s family [Clarence Thomas’s family] received 1.5 million dollars 
from health care reform opponents and is about to rule on health care reform.’’51 Although one 
can question how much money was really at stake, it is true that Virginia Thomas earned money 
in her attempts to bring down Obamacare.  
 Legal scholar Sherrilyn Ifill argues that there is a case for recusal and if Thomas does not 
recuse he should at least publish a statement explaining why he did not do so. She argues that: 
‘‘Mrs. Thomas’s formation of Liberty Central was motivated, developed, and focused almost 
exclusively on what she and her supporters regard as the ‘tyrannical’ passage of the health care  
                                                 
47
 Michael McAuliff, ‘‘Weiner: Clarence Thomas Should Bow Out of Health Cases,’’ NY Daily News, February 22, 
2013, http://www.nydailynews.com/blogs/dc/weiner-clarence-thomas-bow-health-cases-blog-entry-1.1664111. 
48
 Blackman, 34. 
49
 Jeffrey Toobin, ‘‘Will Clarence and Virginia Thomas succeed in killing Obama’s health-care plan?,’’ The New 
Yorker, August 29, 2011, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/08/29/partners-jeffrey-toobin. 
50
 Toobin. 
51
 Elizabeth Flock, ‘‘Meme Alleges Clarence Thomas's Wife Got $1.5M From Healthcare Act Foes,’’ US News, June 
22, 2012, http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/washington-whispers/2012/06/22/meme-alleges-clarence-thomass-
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legislation. Mrs. Thomas reportedly suggested that the law was unconstitutional.”52 In addition, 
Justice Thomas made statements in support of his wife’s work. These statements ‘‘appear to be 
specifically directed at her activism in opposition to the health care bill.’’53 Ifill thus concludes 
that Thomas’ impartiality is questionable. Professor Michael Gerhardt goes even further saying 
that:  
 
I think it is possible she - Ginni Thomas - might have significant interests in the dispute 
before the Court [… a]nd these interests are not restricted only to financial ones. The 
code, after all, forbids judges from engaging in conduct that undermines their impartiality 
or the appearance of impartiality. In Thomas’s case, the evidence so far seems compelling 
enough to put the burden on the Justice to explain why he does not believe he has to 
recuse himself.54 
 
There are thus many who call on Thomas to recuse himself, but not everybody agrees that his 
wife’s activities give ground for recusal. Professor Eric Segall believes that a Justice should not 
recuse him- or herself because of a spouse’s involvement with an issue. This could set a 
dangerous precedent and invite endless discussions about recusal.55 ‘‘Why stop at spouses? How 
about a child, a best friend, or a mother-in-law? Furthermore, imputing to a judge the views of 
his or her spouse expresses an old-fashioned view of marriage and may deter spouses, most often 
women, from pursuing important careers.’’56  
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Arguments on both sides are compelling. It seems rather unique that a Justice can hear a 
case in which his or her spouse is involved. However, in this particular case it seems unlikely 
that Justice Thomas was influenced by his wife. According to The Supreme Court Review 
Thomas ‘‘is regarded by many as the most conservative Justice on the Supreme Court.’’57 CBS 
News reports on Thomas: ‘‘He is the court's only African American, and it's most conservative 
member.’’58 Thomas is even ranked the number seven most conservative Supreme Court Justice 
of all time.59 The fact that he voted to strike down the law is thus not very surprising. He 
probably did not need his wife to convince him how to vote. Moreover, a majority of all the 
critique came from Democrats. They would most likely not have protested, had Thomas been a 
liberal. The critique is thus based along party lines. Although Justices should be careful about 
looking biased or influenced, in this case that was most likely not the truth. Thomas’s vote most 
likely did not change due to his wife’s career. The question whether Thomas’s conservatism is 
caused by ideological or legal values is further explored in the third chapter about King v. 
Burwell. 
The third, and final, Justice who has been surrounded with controversy is Justice Elena 
Kagan. Just like with Thomas, people called on her to recuse herself: not because of her spouse, 
but because of a previous office she had held. In 2009, President Obama appointed Kagan as 
Solicitor General. The Solicitor General’s office is tasked with conducting government litigation 
in the Supreme Court. While Kagan was acting as Solicitor General, the first ACA cases went to 
Court, giving her office the job to defend the act before court. For this reason many people, this 
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time especially Republicans, doubted her impartiality. Senator Hatch, for instance, said: ‘‘I think 
that Kagan, who was the Solicitor General at the time this was all done, probably should recuse 
herself.’’60 Other conservative groups, such as the Judicial Watch and the Judicial Crisis 
Network, also called for recusal and just like Thomas, Kagan did not respond to these calls.61  
Opponents use an email that Kagan sent as evidence of her involvement in the case and 
her enthusiasm about ACA. In this email Kagan wrote to Laurens Tribe, a legal advisor to the 
administration: ‘‘I hear they have the votes, Larry!!’’62 In an answer to this, Kagan defenders 
quote an email from Kagan to her Deputy Neal Katyal in which Kagan wrote: ‘‘you should do 
it,’’63 herby distancing herself from the case, knowing that she might be nominated as Supreme 
Court Justice. For some, like professor Ifill, this is enough to condone Kagan’s decision not to 
recuse herself. Others, like Professor Segall, do not show this kind of forgiveness. Segall argues 
that Kagan is responsible for the actions of her office, whether she was directly involved or not. 
Her office and her Deputy were knee-deep involved and therefore by extension Kagan 
“participated as counsel, adviser, or material witness concerning the proceeding.”64 Furthermore, 
Kagan ‘‘permitted her Office to work on the case in the lower courts against the Solicitor 
General’s normal policy of handling only Supreme Court litigation.’’65 Kagan thus made a 
deliberate course of action on ACA and therefore her impartiality can reasonably be questioned. 
Segall further argues that this case it not essentially different from other cases the Solicitor 
General’s office worked on during the time Kagan was its head. From these other cases Kagan 
did recuse herself; she recued herself in 25 of the 51 cases that were heard before the Supreme 
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Court in her first term. The ACA is the only exception. Segall implies that the reason for this is 
that the ACA case is of extreme importance to President Obama, Kagan’s former employer and 
appointer to the Supreme Court, who at the time of National Federation of Independent Business 
v. Sebelius was up for reelection.66 This, of course, is mere speculation, but for Segall all these 
reasons give enough ground for recusal.  
Both Thomas and Kagan never publically explained their reasons for non-recusal.67 
Whereas Thomas would most likely have voted the same, had his wife not been actively 
involved in anti-Obamacare campaigns, the same cannot be said with the same certainty of 
Kagan. Although Kagan is considered a liberal and left-wing judge, her vote in National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius is somewhat unexpected. As expected, she voted 
with Justice Roberts and the other left-wing Justices to uphold the individual mandate, but she 
deviated from the left when she joined Roberts and the Right in the decision to declare the 
Medicaid expansion unconstitutional. Kagan thus did not vote completely as expected, but this 
was not due to her job as Solicitor General. One would expect her to uphold the entire law as an 
Obama appointee. The fact that she did not do so, might be because she was trying to look 
unbiased and uninfluenced by her former office/ employer. Another explanation, as suggested by 
professor Adam Winkler is that Kagan is already trying to win some of the Rights’ Justices 
respect and support, so that one day she might be appointed as Chief Justice.68 Also important to 
keep in mind is that Kagan’s vote was not crucial to the outcome. Together with the conservative 
Justices, Roberts already had a majority. It is therefore not unlikely that her vote was more of a 
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peacekeeping vote. Whatever the reason, both Kagan and Roberts’s votes were different than 
what we might have expected given their Presidential appointee and political leaning. Thomas, 
on the other hand, voted exactly as we might expect.   
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The Second Challenge: Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores 
 
In the second Supreme Court challenge to the ACA, not the entire law, but only a small part of it 
was being questioned. Hobby Lobby Stores brought suit to the government because they did not 
agree with the ‘contraceptive mandate.’69 This mandate requires employers to include twenty 
different contraceptives in their health insurance, four of which prevent the implantation of a 
fertilized egg. The owners of Hobby Lobby Stores, the Green family, state that the use of these 
four contraceptives go against their Christian beliefs, and therefore they do not want to facilitate 
the use of these contraceptives for their employees. 70  The company itself is also founded on 
Christian values. On their website it is even stated that Hobby Lobby Stores is committed to 
‘‘honoring the Lord in all we do by operating the company in a manner consistent with Biblical 
principles.’’71 The Greens argue that their religious freedom is violated with the arrival of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the contraceptive mandate. Therefore, they 
challenged the mandate in court and this challenge also worked itself up to the Supreme Court.  
 For their claim, Hobby Lobby Stores refer to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 
1993 (RFRA) which, according to Hobby Lobby: 
 
prohibits the Government [from] substantially burden[ing] a person’s exercise of religion 
even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability unless the Government 
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person—(1) is in furtherance of a 
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compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that 
compelling governmental interest.72  
 
Congress foresaw the (religious) problems that certain people would have with this contraceptive 
mandate. Therefore, it created exemptions for specific groups. The groups that are exempted 
from the mandate are religious employers such as churches, certain non-profit organizations, 
grandfathered plans (these are plans that have not substantially changed after the implementation 
of ACA), and businesses with fewer than 50 employees.73 Hobby Lobby Stores does not fall 
under one of these categories and is therefore not eligible for exemption from the contraceptive 
mandate. Consequently, they went to Court to get exempted anyway.  
 The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) argued that for-profit companies 
are not eligible for exemption because a company is not a person. Furthermore, according to 
HHS the owner cannot sue, because the regulations apply to the business, not the person behind 
it. The Supreme Court, however, ruled that the for-profit company can be seen as a person, and 
can therefore sue, because there is no real distinction between for-profit and non-profit 
corporations and because HHS has made an exemption for non-profit corporations.74 HHS 
further argued that RFRA is not applicable to businesses, because businesses cannot ‘‘exercise … 
religion.’’75 However, the Supreme Court decided that businesses can exercise religion. Why else 
would non-profit organizations be exempted? HHS also argued that it would be too difficult to 
determine the beliefs of large for-profit companies, but the Court decided that these are sincere 
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beliefs and therefore valid. It is also not possible for Hobby Lobby to pay the fine that comes 
with changing the standard health care. The Court believes that the fine for not having adequate 
health insurance is so high that a corporation would go out of business if it does not comply. 
Therefore, not complying is not a real option.76  
 Finally, HHS was not able to convince the Court that allowing exemption would be 
against compelling governmental interest or that the contraceptive mandate is the least restrictive 
means of furthering that compelling government interest. The Court argues that some exemptions 
are already made, and therefore it is not a compelling government interest that every person has 
access to these contraceptives. Furthermore, the Court suggests that the government could take 
up the costs of these contraceptives for those women who have insufficient insurance. Or the 
government could extend the accommodations it has already made for employees of non-profit 
organizations and religious employers. ‘‘That accommodation does not impinge on the plaintiffs’ 
religious beliefs that providing insurance coverage for the contraceptives at issue here violates 
their religion and it still serves HHS’s stated interests.’’77 HHS was thus unable to prove that this 
is the least restrictive way of providing contraceptive care. The Supreme Court therefore decided 
in favor of Hobby Lobby Stores et al. 
 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores was a 5-4 vote. Alito, Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy and 
Thomas all decided in favor of Hobby Lobby Stores. Roberts thus switched camps with regards 
to the earlier Obamacare challenge, now joining the conservatives. Kennedy filed a concurring 
opinion stating that everybody wins because religious freedom is guaranteed and at the same 
time this would not substantially burden women since there are already government provisions to 
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accommodate contraceptives for women.78 According to Duke, ‘‘Kennedy played the role of 
peacekeeper in in this decision.’’79 Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Breyer, and Kagan dissented from the 
majority opinion. Ginsburg, who is known for ‘‘relentlessly arguing for gender equality in the 
law,’’80 wrote the dissent. One of the most important objections that Ginsburg makes is that the 
ruling can be applied too generally in the future. She states: ‘‘until today, religious exemptions 
had never been extended to any entity operating in ‘the commercial, profit-making world.’’’81 
She further argues that religious organizations serve people within their own faith or belief 
system. For for-profit corporations this is not the case. Therefore, for-profit corporations should 
not be allowed religious exemptions according to Ginsburg: ‘‘religious organizations exist to 
foster the interests of persons subscribing to the same religious faith. Not so of for-profit 
corporations. Workers who sustain the operations of those corporations commonly are not drawn 
from one religious community. Indeed, by law, no religion-based criterion can restrict the work 
force of for-profit corporations.’’82 
 Most notable is that Roberts decided against HHS/ ACA in this case, whereas in National 
Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius he voted for HHS/ ACA. This could signal that 
he is not basing his vote on the survival or destruction of Obamacare, an ideological vote, but 
that he casts his vote based on the legal arguments/ values. All the other Justices voted similarly 
to their vote in National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius. Those who thought 
Obamacare unconstitutional, now sided with Hobby Lobby, and those who thought Obamacare 
was constitutional now sided with HHS.  
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 At first glance, nothing unexpected comes to light in this case. The judges voted in a 
manner that we would expect them to do and the arguments seem valid. However, three days 
after the Hobby Lobby decision, the Supreme Court ordered an emergency injunction which was 
in contradiction with their recent Hobby Lobby decision. In Wheaton College v. Burwell, 
Wheaton College sued the government because they believe the use of the EBSA Form 700 
conflicts with their religious freedom. Wheaton College, an evangelical Protestant liberal arts 
college, is seen as a religious non-profit and is therefore, in contrast to Hobby Lobby Stores, 
exempt from the ACA’s contraceptive mandate. In order to make use of this exemption, the 
government decided that religious non-profit organizations should fill out the EBSA Form 700 
and send it to the government and their health care provider. The health care provider is then by 
law required to pay for the contraceptives instead of the employer. Although this provision is 
meant as an ‘out’ for religious non-profits, Wheaton College does not see it that way. They 
believe that by signing the form they trigger the obligation for someone else to pay for the 
service. The act of filling out the form thus makes contraceptives available for their employees, 
which is against their religious beliefs.83  
 While the Wheaton suit was pending in the 10th circuit, the college applied to the 
Supreme Court for a temporary injunction order shielding the college from having to abide by 
the government procedure for applying for religious exemption.84 The Supreme Court ruled that  
 
‘‘if the applicant informs the Secretary of Health and Human Services in writing that it is 
a nonprofit organization that holds itself out as religious and has religious objections to 
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providing coverage for contraceptive services, the respondents are enjoined from 
enforcing against the applicant the challenged provisions of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act and related regulations pending final disposition of appellate review. 
To meet the condition for injunction pending appeal, the applicant need not use the form 
prescribed by the Government, EBSA Form 700, and need not send copies to health 
insurance issuers or third-party administrators.85  
 
The fact that the court granted this relief is in itself rare and extraordinary. In Mazurek v. 
Armstrong the Supreme Court stated ‘‘it frequently is observed that a preliminary injunction is an 
extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear 
showing, carries the burden of persuasion.’’86 But according to Justice Sotomayer, joined by 
Justices Ginsburg and Kagan in het dissent, ‘‘no one could credibly claim Wheaton’s right to 
relief is indisputably clear.’’87 In a very strongly worded 15-page long dissent (the injunction 
itself covers only one page), Justice Sotomayer argues that the EBSA Form is legitimate because 
it is ‘‘the least restrictive means of furthering the Government’s compelling interests in public 
health and women’s well-being.’’88 This, she argues, was decided in Hobby Lobby Stores v. 
Burwell only three days earlier. In Hobby Lobby, it was decided that letting employers pay for 
health insurance was not the least restrictive way to further a compelling government interest. 
Alternatively, the Court offered an expansion of the accommodations made for religious non-
profits as a ‘least restrictive’ way of offering contraceptives to women. Only three days later, it 
turns out that this accommodation is suddenly not the ‘least restrictive’ way anymore. Sotomayer 
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consequently argues:  
 
Those who are bound by our decisions usually believe they can take us at our word. Not 
so today. After expressly relying on the availability of the religious-nonprofit 
accommodation to hold that the contraceptive coverage requirement violates RFRA as 
applied to closely held for-profit corporations, the Court now, as the dissent in Hobby 
Lobby feared it might retreats from that position. That action evinces disregard for even 
the newest of this Court’s precedents and undermines confidence in this institution. 89 
 
The decision in Wheaton College v. Burwell could thus at least be called curious. Notably, all 
three dissenters are women. It is interesting to see which Justices voted for this injunction. As is 
common in these injunctions, it is not signed and we do not know how the other Justices voted. 
Therefore, we cannot say with certainty who agreed to the injunction. We do know that Justices 
Sotomayer, Ginsburg, and Kagan dissented. Furthermore, we know that Justice Scalia gave a, 
albeit very short, concurring opinion. This most likely means that he does not agree with the 
opinion, but he does agree with the result. According to Tom Goldstein it can be reasonably 
assumed that for the judgement to stand as a court judgement, a majority of the Justices would 
have had to agree on the language.90 This means that five Justices must have voted for this 
injunction. These must then be Justices Alito, Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas, and Breyer. The first 
four plus Scalia also voted for Hobby Lobby three days earlier. In Hobby Lobby they judged the 
government’s accommodation for non-profits to be the ‘least restrictive’ means to ensuring 
contraceptives and suggested the government expand this program for closely held for-profit 
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corporations like Hobby Lobby Stores. Three days later, the Court suddenly sees an even less 
restrictive means of ensuring a compelling government interest. This could mean many things, 
but it certainly questions the Court’s consistency.  
 Sotomayer openly questions the reliability of the Court. She even suggests that the Court 
might have: 
 
a bare desire to suspend the existing state of affairs: Wheaton’s entitlement to relief must 
be indisputably clear. While Wheaton’s religious conviction is undoubtedly entitled to 
respect, it does not come close to affording a basis for relief under the law. […]Wheaton’s 
third-party administrator bears the legal obligation to provide contraceptive coverage 
only upon receipt of a valid self-certification. […] Today’s injunction thus risks depriving 
hundreds of Wheaton’s employees and students of their legal entitlement to contraceptive 
coverage. In addition, because Wheaton is materially indistinguishable from other 
nonprofits that object to the Government’s accommodation, the issuance of an injunction 
in this case will presumably entitle hundreds or thousands of other objectors to the same 
remedy. 91  
 
Health insurers are namely not responsible to pay for women’s contraceptive care unless they 
have been granted a valid certification of the employer’s exemption. Although theoretically the 
government could take up the task of informing the health insurer of its obligation, the injunction 
still creates much (administrative) uncertainty and bureaucracy and ‘‘The Court has no reason to 
think that the administrative scheme it foists on the Government today is workable or effective 
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on a national scale.’’92 It is especially interesting to see why Roberts and Breyer (assumedly) 
voted for the injunction.  
 The injunction has brought forward many doubts about the Court’s legitimacy. Even 
voices inside the Court openly questioned the decision of the Court. As seen in Chapter 1, 
Roberts is very much concerned with the Court’s legitimacy. Why would he then vote in favor of 
such a controversial decision? Denying Wheaton College the injunction would have been much 
easier and in line with the Court’s views of using injunctions only as ‘extraordinary remedies.’93 
No precedents would have been ignored, and the Court’s legitimacy would not be at stake. Since 
the legal decision was very unusual, and not motivated by Robert’s institutional identity as a 
Chief Justice, or his legal value of judicial restraint, it is thus possible that this was, as Sotomayer 
carefully suggests, a political decision based on his ideological values. Of course, it is possible 
that Roberts abstained from voting, but this is rather unlikely if you do the math. 
 One could also wonder why (and if) Justice Breyer voted for this injunction. In the 
Hobby Lobby case he dissented and agreed with Ginsburg that ‘‘none of the proffered 
alternatives would satisfactorily serve the compelling interests to which Congress responded.’’94 
Therefore, the EBSA Form 700 is indirectly judged by Breyer as ‘the least restrictive’ means. 
Why then would he allow Wheaton College to circumvent that? Goldstein speculates that Breyer 
might have agreed because he could not completely join Sotomayer’s dissent. If Breyer then 
were to dissent as well, he had to write a separate dissent, and by doing so he could undercut 
Sotomayer’s dissent. It seems rather far-fetched, though, that a Justice would go against his or 
her own values, just so that the dissent is stronger. Another possibility is that Breyer joined the 
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majority because without a majority agreement on the text, this case, and hundreds of cases that 
would follow, would be left with no clear guidelines. At least with this injunction, Wheaton 
College is still obligated to inform the government that it objects to providing contraceptives. 
Therefore, government can take up that responsibility if it wishes to do so. Whereas, with no 
clear guidelines, other courts may decide that religious entities do not need to inform the 
government at all, leaving potentially thousands of women without care.95 It could thus be that 
Breyer only consented, because the alternative is much worse.  
Unfortunately, it is unlikely that we will figure out the truth, because the inner workings 
of the Supreme Court remain clouded in mystery. Nevertheless, the Wheaton College injunction 
does raise questions about the sincerity of the legal arguments in both Wheaton College v. 
Burwell and Hobby Lobby Stores v. Burwell. Not just Justices Breyer and Roberts’s decisions, but 
also the decisions of Justices Alito, Thomas, and Kennedy raise questions. We do not know what 
Scalia’s arguments are for concurring with the result. Therefore, we cannot say whether Scalia’s 
vote was consistent or inconsistent with Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores. Nevertheless, his 
decision raises questions. Why for instance would he not explain his reasons for concurring? 
Since the legal arguments are not consistent, it is possible that ideological values hide behind the 
decision in Wheaton College v. Burwell.   
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The Third Challenge: King v. Burwell 
 
The third challenge to the ACA is King v. Burwell. In this lawsuit the plaintiffs are four 
individuals living in Virginia. These individuals obtain a tax credit from the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) in order to help them pay their health insurance fees. With this tax credit, buying 
health insurance costs these individuals less than eight percent of their income. Therefore, they 
are required to buy health insurance through the individual mandate. Without the tax credit, 
though, health insurance would cost them more than eight percent of their income and therefore 
leave them exempt from the requirement of buying health insurance. This exemption was made 
for those people who, even with the tax credit, are too poor to afford health insurance. The 
plaintiffs in this case would rather not have health insurance. Even though the tax credit helps 
them pay their health insurance fees, it does not cover the whole fee. If the plaintiffs do not get 
any tax credit, health insurance fees would take up more of their income and leave them exempt 
from buying health insurance. Therefore, these individuals prefer not to be eligible for tax credit. 
For their claim they rely on a literal reading of the text of the ACA which states that ‘‘tax credits 
shall be allowed” for any “applicable taxpayer,” 26 U. S. C. §36B(a), but only if the taxpayer has 
enrolled in an insurance plan through “an Exchange established by the State under [42 U. S. C. 
§18031].”96 By an Exchange, Congress means a health care market. The ACA gives states the 
opportunity to either create its own exchange or to opt for the federal government to create one. 
Since Virginia has a federal exchange, the plaintiffs argue that they should not be eligible for tax 
credit, because tax credit is only available for Exchanges established by the state. 
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 The Supreme Court’s task was to provide the correct reading of section 36B. The 
majority recognized that the most natural meaning of the statue would be that individuals in 
states that have Federal Exchanges should not receive tax credit.97 However, the majority also 
states that they must read the words in their context. For this they rely on their decision in FDA v. 
Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corp which states that ‘‘the court should not confine itself to 
examining a particular statutory provision in isolation. Rather, it must place the provision in 
context, interpreting the statute to create a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme.’’98 With 
this in mind the majority decided that section 36B does include individuals who live in states that 
have a Federal Exchange. If tax credits are not allowed in states with a Federal Exchange, the 
health insurance market in that state would destabilize. Too many people would then be able to 
opt out of buying health insurance, because the insurance would be too expensive. These people 
would only start buying health insurance when they get sick, because health insurers are no 
longer allowed to refuse people with pre-existing conditions. Then, premiums will rise to pay for 
increased costs and more people will opt out. Eventually this will lead to a ‘death spiral’ and the 
Exchange will crash. The Court states that it is:  
 
implausible that Congress meant the Act to operate in this manner. Congress made the 
guaranteed issue and community rating requirements applicable in every State in the 
Nation, but those requirements only work when combined with the coverage requirement 
and tax credits. It thus stands to reason that Congress meant for those provisions to apply 
in every State as well.99  
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98 U.S. Supreme Court. 2000. Food and Drug Administration, et al., v. Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corp., et al., 
syllabus 98-1152 U.S. 2. 
99 King v. Burwell, syllabus, 4. 
34 
 
The majority further concludes that ‘‘Congress passed the Affordable Care Act to improve health 
insurance markets, not to destroy them. If at all possible, we must interpret the Act in a way that 
is consistent with the former, and avoids the latter.’’100 The Court thus tried to determine what 
Congress meant when approving ACA instead of relying on what Congress has actually written.  
The majority opinion, written by Roberts, seems to imply that this section was merely a mistake, 
and not a purposefully written section. Roberts literally writes that the Act ‘‘contains more than a 
few examples of inartful drafting.’’101 This should not be reason to kill the act.  
 Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined Roberts’ majority 
opinion. Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito dissented. The dissent is strongly worded and written 
by Scalia. He quotes Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co, stating that ‘‘the plain, obvious, and rational 
meaning of a statue is always to be preferred to any curious, narrow, hidden sense.’’102 He also 
quotes Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, stating that the Court “does not revise 
legislation . . . just because the text as written creates an apparent anomaly.”103 Words like 
absurd, obvious, common sense, and SCOTUScare are characteristic for the dissent, signaling to 
a real divide in the Court over the ACA cases. The dissent even states that the ‘‘overriding 
principle of the present Court [is that] the Affordable Care Act must be saved.’’104  
It is surprising that Kennedy joined the liberal Justices in upholding the actions of the 
IRS. In the first two legal challenges to ObamaCare, Kennedy joined the conservative block. He 
thus switched sides. Justice Kennedy is known as a moderate conservative, who sometimes 
switches to the liberal side of the bench. Because of this he is known as a key swing voter and 
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was named ‘‘the most powerful jurist in America’’105 by The New York Times. It is hard to think 
of Kennedy in one single frame. He himself says: ‘‘I am searching, as I think many judges are, 
for the correct balance in constitutional interpretation.”106 He also states that he does not have 
“an over-arching theory, a unitary theory of interpretation.”107 Therefore, many scholars have 
difficulty with placing Kennedy in a certain tradition, but most concur that he is a moderate 
conservative.108 Anthony Bartl has attempted to find consistency in Kennedy’s votes and 
opinions, and has found that the principles of liberty and equality are extremely important in 
Kennedy’s eyes.109 Chris Walker, a former clerk for Kennedy states that ‘‘federalism is 
something he cares deeply about.’’110 During oral arguments Kennedy also hinted towards this: 
 
Let me say that from the standpoint of the dynamics of federalism, it does seem to me 
that there is something very powerful to the point that if your [the plaintiff’s] argument is 
accepted, the states are being told either create your own exchange, or we’ll send your 
insurance market into a death spiral. We’ll have people pay mandated taxes which will 
not get any credit… on the subsidies. The cost of insurance will be sky-high, but this is 
not coercion? It seems to me that under your argument, perhaps you will prevail in the 
plain words of the statute, there’s a serious constitutional problem if we adopt your 
argument.111 
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Noticeable during the oral arguments is that Kennedy does not mention the consequences for the 
people. He only mentions the consequences for the states. His belief in federalism and the belief 
that states should be able to make their own decisions, thus prevail here.   
 Contrary to what we might think, Justice Kennedy’s decision is in line with his decision 
in National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius. In this case, Kennedy together 
with Scalia, Thomas, and Alito dissented and argued, just like the majority opinion that the 
Medicaid expansion was unconstitutional because it did not leave states with a real choice to opt 
out and that would put their healthcare exchange in a ‘deathspiral.’ The majority then decided 
that the Medicaid expansion could remain as long as states would not lose their ‘old’ Medicaid 
subsidies when opting out. The dissenters argued that this too is unconstitutional, because it 
would still require states that choose to opt out to pay for the expansion of other states through 
federal tax.112  Justice Kennedy can thus be seen as a big proponent of federalism, and equal 
treatment of all states. The fact that he voted once to declare the ACA unconstitutional, and once 
to uphold the ACA, shows that he is not influenced by his ideological values, but by his legal 
values.  
 But then what about Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito? If Justice Kennedy’s decision to 
uphold the ACA in King was a legal decision in line with his dissent in National Federation of 
Independent Businesses, is it possible that Scalia, Thomas, and Alito did not follow their own 
precedent in NFIB by forming the dissent in King? Scalia, Thomas, and Alito base their dissent 
in King on a plain, natural reading of the statue, an originalist approach. Scalia often states that 
he is an originalist in an effort to defend his legal ideology.113 Scalia is even named the ‘patron 
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saint’ of new originalism.114 According to Kesavan and Paulsen, Scalia has single-handedly 
changed originalism, which focuses on the original intention of the Founding Fathers and the 
original understanding of its Ratifiers, to new originalism or textualism, which focuses on the 
original meaning of the words and phrases. This original meaning is not always the same as the 
original intention.115 Justice Thomas, too adheres to this school of thought. According to 
Kesevan together they ‘‘have been popularizing the phrase ‘original meaning’ in the United 
States Reports.’’116 However, Scalia and Thomas have often been criticized for applying their 
textualism inconsistently and often they do not offer a historical validation. For instance, Iyer 
notes that Scalia, in Texas v. Johnson, ruled that the First Amendment protected the right to burn 
the American flag. However, he did not demonstrate any proof that this is in accordance with the 
First Amendment's original public meaning.117 Cass Sunstein goes one step further 
demonstrating that Scalia and Thomas’s ruling against affirmative action did not mention the 
original meaning of the Equal Protection Clause at all. Furthermore, an originalist reading of the 
Clause would actually prove the constitutionality of affirmative action.118  
Even though there is much critique about the misuse of originalism by Scalia and Thomas 
in general, in the case of King v. Burwell Scalia and Thomas did apply originalism correctly. In 
the legal ideology of originalism, ‘an Exchange established by the State’ simply means that and 
not ‘an Exchange established by the State and by the federal government’. Furthermore, it is 
possible that Scalia and Thomas hold their originalist value to be more important than their 
federalist value. For Kennedy, federalism and equality are more important than a plain reading of 
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the text. The opposite might well hold true for Scalia and Thomas. Nevertheless, if Scalia and 
Thomas do not use originalism consequently, it may still well be the case that they only use 
originalism now because it would lead to their preferred ideological outcome. According to Iyer: 
‘‘Justices Scalia and Thomas fail to adequately account for the inconsistencies in their 
approaches, undermining original public meaning's claim to promote judicial constraint in 
practice.’’119 If this is true, their legal value of originalism is thus only a cover for their 
ideological conservatism. 
 The third dissenting Justice, Alito, is harder to place in a certain judicial school of 
thought. He does not talk about originalism, or any other school of thought, as openly as Scalia 
and Thomas. Therefore, many scholars have tried to determine his judicial ideology. Stronks, for 
instance, states that ‘‘both Roberts and Alito give every indication of being textualists as they 
examine statutes. This makes them similar to Scalia.’’120 Nevertheless, she also recognizes that, 
on occasion, both Roberts and Alito will also look at the intent of the legislators. This is 
something that Roberts clearly did in King. Therefore, it is very hard to place Alito (but also 
Roberts) in a certain school of thought. Elliot Davis tries to overcome this by arguing that Alito 
belongs to the school of ‘newer textualism’. This means that he is mainly focused on the text 
itself, but also looks at the historical context to ensure ‘‘that he has not inadvertently deemed 
plain what actually is ambiguous.’’121 To prove his point, Davis looks amongst others to Justice 
Alito’s confirmation hearings where he said:  
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I have often looked to legislative history in the cases that I have written concerning 
statutory interpretation. And I think if anybody looks at those opinions they will see that. 
When I interpret a statute, I do begin with the text of the statute. I think that certainly is 
the clearest indication of what Congress as a whole had in mind in passing the statute. 
And sometimes the language of the statute is dispositive and is really - the decision can 
be made based on the language of the statute itself. But when there is an ambiguity in the 
statute, I think it is entirely legitimate to look to legislative history, and as I said, I 
have often done that.122 
 
This combination of looking at the text and sometimes looking at the intent as well makes it 
particularly hard to apply in a consistent manner. Roberts, in the case of King, clearly looked at 
intent, but for Alito this was not necessary. As argued in the first chapter, Roberts’s reasons for 
looking at intent might have more to do with his institutional identity. By joining the majority, 
the case was decided in a 6-3 vote, which signals a more stable, legitimate court, than a 5-4 vote. 
His legal value of judicial restraint may also have been more important to him than the legal 
value of textualism.  
Then remains the question of why Alito did not look at the congressional intent in this 
particular case. A possible answer to this is that he judged the text to be so clear and 
unambiguous, that it was not necessary to look at the intent. In that case, he judged this case 
based on his legal value. Nevertheless, this is still ambiguous as Stronks argues: ‘‘as we consider 
the Alito hearings, it is important that we resist the temptation to characterize him as a textualist 
versus an activist, or a conservative versus a liberal. If Alito has shown us that he understands the 
importance of a textualist approach but he also understands its limits, he will be a unifying voice 
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on the court. On the other hand, if he has suggested that textualism gives all the answers 
necessary to either the interpretation of the Constitution or the interpretation of statutes, then we 
have a clue that ideology may trump legal analysis.’’123 Stronks does not give adequate 
arguments for this claim, but as we have seen Scalia’s and Thomas’s textualism is inconsistent, 
so there could be some truth to this claim. It is also possible that Alito did not look at the intent 
because that would lead to a liberal outcome. As a conservative judge and Bush appointee, this 
would most likely not be his preferred political outcome. If this is the case, then Alito was 
motivated by ideological values. It is hard to determine what exactly motivated his choice, but 
there is ample reason to be skeptical of his legal arguments.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
123 Stronks.   
41 
 
Conclusion 
 
‘‘I think judicial temperament is a willingness to step back from your own committed views of 
the correct jurisprudential approach and evaluate those views in terms of your role as a judge. It’s 
the difference between being a judge and being a law professor.”  
        Chief Justice John G. Roberts124 
 
This quote from Chief Justice Roberts illustrates a judge’s task to suppress his or her own 
ideological values and to make decisions based on legal values. For Chief Justice Roberts this 
also means taking the Court’s institutional role and legitimacy seriously. In the Obamacare cases, 
Robert’s relied on his identity as Chief Justice, as he did not want to damage the Court’s 
reputation. We can see this most notably in National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius, but also in King v. Burwell. In the aftermath of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores we see a 
different kind of Roberts, though. His decision to grant Wheaton College an emergency 
injunction is very unusual and controversial. Furthermore, it directly challenged the Court’s 
legitimacy since it shows an inconsistency in rulings. His vote in Wheaton College v. Burwell 
can also not be motivated by his legal value of judicial restraint, as restraint would mean not 
granting the injunction. What does speak to Roberts’s advantage is that he did not vote 
consistently for or against the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. This means that he 
was not (always) guided by his ideological values. Nevertheless, doubts remain about Roberts’s 
arguments in Wheaton College v. Burwell and therefore also about Hobby Lobby Stores v. 
Burwell.  
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 Secondly, Justice Thomas was also surrounded by controversy regarding his decisions in 
the Obamacare cases. In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius many called on 
Thomas to recuse himself because he could be influenced by his wife Virginia, who is active in 
organizations whose purpose it is to repeal the ACA. Financial stakes were even at stake for 
Virginia Thomas. There are no clear rules about when a Justice should recuse him- or herself, 
though, so technically Thomas did nothing wrong. It is also unlikely that Thomas was influenced 
by his wife, as he is often called ‘‘the most conservative Justice on the Supreme Court.’’125 It is 
thus not very surprising that he voted to strike down the law. As far as legal values go, Justice 
Thomas calls himself an originalist. This means he looks at the original meaning of words and 
phrases. This legal value explains his votes in the Obamacare cases. For instance, for an 
originalist it is impossible to interpret a penalty as a tax in one instance, and as not a tax in the 
other.  
A much heard critique is that Thomas (and Scalia who is also an originalist) does not 
apply originalism in a consistent matter. His inconsistency is also visible in Wheaton College v. 
Burwell where both Thomas and Scalia (as well as Alito, Roberts, and Kennedy) voted 
inconsistent with their own precedent set three days earlier. This inconsistency could signal that 
both Thomas and Scalia merely use originalism when it suits them; that is when it is compatible 
with their ideological values. Especially in Thomas’s case we know that he is personally against 
the ACA, as he has made statements in support of his wife’s work. Justice Alito’s legal value of 
newer textualism is somewhat different from Thomas’s and Scalia’s originalism, as it not only 
looks at the text, but sometimes also at the original intent. In King v. Burwell Alito did not look at 
the intent. This could be because he thought the text was so clear that he did not need to look at 
the intent. However, it is also possible that he did not look at the intent because that would lead 
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to a liberal outcome. Because newer textualism is a legal school which sometimes looks at the 
text and sometimes at the context, it is very easy to apply newer textualism to your preferred 
ideological outcome. Therefore, one must be wary of the arguments made through the use of 
newer textualism.  
Justice Kennedy is the only Justice about whom it can be reasonably said that he acted 
according to his legal value of federalism and equal treatment of all states. Just like Roberts, 
Kennedy voted once to uphold the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and once to strike 
it down. With Roberts, however, some doubts remain about his objectivity. With Kennedy this is 
not the case, and his variety of voting proves that he based his decisions on legal values instead 
of ideological ones.  
 Justice Elena Kagan was also called upon to recuse herself because as Solicitor General 
she was responsible for conducting the government litigation of the ACA in the lower courts. In 
her first year as Supreme Court Justice, for this reason she recused herself from 25 of the 51 
cases before the Supreme Court. National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius was 
the only exception. As expected, she voted to uphold most of the law. Surprisingly, though, she 
struck down the Medicaid expansion. Possible reasons for this are that she wants to look 
unbiased by her former office, or that she wants to gain the support of the Justices on the Right. 
The fact that she decided not to recuse herself from this case could be that she personally wanted 
the act to survive. It is hard to think of any other reason why she would not recuse herself. This 
case is not fundamentally different from the other 25 cases that her former office provided 
litigation for. Why then, would she recuse herself from those cases, but not from this case? Since 
Justices themselves are solely responsible for the decision to recuse or not, this can lead to a 
questionable outcome. In order to look less ideologically or politically influenced, it might be 
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better if the Supreme Court Justices could be held accountable for their decision to recuse or not. 
When there are serious calls, with serious extralegal arguments, on two out of nine Justices to 
recuse, and neither do so, this affects the legitimacy of the Court.  
 More generally, it might be better if the Supreme Court’s inner workings were less 
secretive. In the case of Wheaton College v. Burwell people are left wondering who voted what. 
Because people do not know how the Justices voted, it might be easier for Justices to vote along 
ideological lines instead of implementing their legal values. For instance, Justice Breyer 
assumedly voted quite differently from what we would expect. The reason for this remains 
uncertain. It is even somewhat uncertain whether he voted for or against the injunction. It is 
therefore also hard to determine whether legal or extralegal arguments guided Breyer’s decision. 
For the Court’s legitimacy it would be better if these decisions were made more publically. That 
way, the Justices at least have to justify their voting behavior.  
 This study shows that many factors come into play when analyzing Supreme Court 
decisions. The complex relationship between legal and ideological values makes it hard to come 
up with a straight answer about the politicization of the Supreme Court. One must be wary of 
oversimplifying the arguments made by the Justices. Large n-studies might be helpful as a 
starting point, but they lack the precision with which to distinguish legal from ideological votes. 
Therefore, more case studies are necessary in order to make a more substantiated claim about the 
politicization of the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, the fact that serious doubts about the 
legitimacy of the arguments used by five out of nine Justices remain, is shocking. Both legal and 
extralegal arguments are used to decide the cases. Sometimes, it might look as if legal arguments 
shape the opinions, but since many legal schools of thought can be or are applied loosely, these 
legal schools can function as a legitimization of ideological or extralegal values.  
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